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Section 19832 is the federal. statute that allows us to
enforce our federal constitutional rights against state and local
government. The significance of Section 1983 cannot be
overstated. Without Section 1983, a Constitutional Law
symposium would be almost irrelevant. The United States
Supreme Court well understands the importance of Section 1983.
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has rendered an
unusually large number of decisions fleshing out the meaning and
intricacies of Section 1983. 3 It seems however, that no matter
how extensive the Supreme Court's involvement, there is always
another Section 1983 issue.
For example, recently I came across a Seventh Circuit
case that raised the question of whether "Frei" was a suable
. B.B.A., Cum Laude, 1966, City College; J.D., Magna Cum Laude,
1968, Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., 1973, New York University. Admitted
to the Bar of New York, Federal District Courts for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and
the U.S. Supreme Court. He was Managing Attorney for the Research and
Appeals Bureau of Westchester Legal Services and an Adjunct Professor at
New York Law School. He has litigated cases in the United States Supreme
Court. He is the author of a bimonthly column in the New York Law Journal
titled "Public Interest Law," and has lectured for the Practising Law Institute
and is co-chairman of its annual Supreme Court review and Section 1983
litigation programs. He is author of a multi-volume treatise on Section 1983
civil rights litigation titled " Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses" (3d
ed. 1997), "Section 1983 Litigation: Jury Instructions" (3d ed. 1999)(co-
authored with George C. Pratt), and "Section 1983 Litigation: Federal
Evidence." He has also written numerous articles on civil rights issues.
2 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2001), provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute... of any State... subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivations of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'r v. Brown; Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S.
347 (1992); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
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defendant under Section 1983. 4 Frei is a police dog, and the
plaintiff named Frei as a defendant in his 1983 suit.5  The
argument advanced by the plaintiff was: If a municipality can be
considered a person within the meaning of Section 1983, then
why not a police dog? 6  The Seventh Circuit rejected the
argument analogizing a dog to a municipality. 7 The court relied
in part on a case holding that a cat is not a person. 8
The court stated that in addition to the statutory
interpretation of the term "person," there would be many
difficulties in allowing a dog to be a named defendant. 9 One such
problem would be with service of process. 10 Another difficult
question that could be raised is whether Frei had a valid retainer
agreement with defense counsel." Additionally, there could be
questions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 12  If Frei had
worked overtime, would he be entitled to overtime pay? Then
there is the problem with qualified immunity. 13 If the rule of
qualified immunity is applied to the conduct of a police dog, does
the question become whether a reasonable dog in Frei's position
would have understood that what he did was unconstitutional?
14
The court raised these questions, but obviously did not explore all
of the ramifications. Just the other day in my Evidence course, I
raised the issue of whether a police dog's bark constitutes
hearsay. The police officer states, "I searched the valise because
the dog's barking gave me probable cause to believe there was
4 See Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2001).
' Id. at 297.6Id. at 299.
7id.
a Id. (citing Miles v. City Council of Augusta, 710 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th
Cir. 1983)).
9Id.
'0 Dye, 253 F.3d at 299.
" Id. (stating "did he retain as his lawyer Lynn E. Kalamaros, who purports
to represent all three defendants? Was Frei offered the right of self-
representation... ").
12 29 U.S.C. § 202 et. seq. (2001).
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marijuana in the valise." Did the dog make an out-of-court
statement. 15 The questions and possibilities are endless.
The United States Supreme Court decided a broad range
of questions dealing with Section 1983 last term. I will list the
issues in the order I am going to discuss them. First, I will
discuss the threshold question of state action. Next, I will move
to the issue of due process requirements when disputes arise out
of governmental contracts. I will then discuss the exhaustion of
state remedies requirements in prisoner litigation, followed by a
discussion of qualified immunity in excessive force cases. The
final issue I will discuss, which many attorneys think is most
paramount, is the right to recover statutory attorney's fees.
I. STATE ACTION
State action is a threshold issue because without state
action there can be no Fourteenth Amendment' 6 violation. And,
without state action the defendant cannot be said to have acted
under the color of state law. 17 If the defendant did not act under
color of state law, there can be no claim for relief under Section
1983.8 The difficult state action question is whether a private
party's involvement with state and local government justifies
treating that party as having engaged in state action, rather than in
private action.1 9  Brentwood Academy v. The Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association is the Supreme Court case
from last term that dealt with this issue.2 ° In Brentwood
1s This statement would not be hearsay because under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, an out-of-court declarant must be a "person." See FED.
R. EviD. 801.
'6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.




20 d. at 288.
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Academy, the Supreme Court held that the defendant athletic
association was engaged state action because it was an
interscholastic athletic association whose members consisted of
virtually all of the public schools in the state of Tennessee.21
More specifically, the association was engaged in state action
when it enforced its rules dealing with the recruitment of student
athletes. 22 Brentwood Academy was a five-to-four decision with
Justice Souter writing for the Court.23 Justice Souter explained
that since almost all of the public schools in Tennessee were
members of the association, and made up approximately 84% of
the association membership there was a largely overlapping
identity between the state public schools and the association.24
This association carried out a regulatory function that otherwise
would have been carried out by the state itself,25 and because the
members of the association were overwhelmingly public schools,
this regulatory function was carried out primarily by public
school officials. 26  The dominant rationale of the decision was
that state action was present because of the state's pervasive
entwinement with the operations of the association.
27
In finding state action in Brentwood Academy, the Court
distinguished its prior decision, in National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Tarkanian.28 In Tarkanian, state action was not
found because the National Collegiate Athletic Association was a
national organization made up of large numbers of private
21 Id. at 290-91.
2 Id. at 290.
2' BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 288 (Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Thomas,
J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy joined).
24 Id. at 298 (Under the bylaws of the association, each school was
represented by their respective principals. Each representative had a single
vote in selecting the governing legislative counsel.).
5 id.
26 id.
27 Id at 302 (the Court concluded that the facts justify the conclusion that
state action was present under criterion of entwinement).
28 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988) (concluding that state action was not present as
the association was substantially composed of private institutions, a vast
majority of which were located in other states).
[Vol 18
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colleges and universities. 29 Conversely, in Brentwood Academy,
the Tennessee Athletic Association was a statewide association
with a large percentage of its members consisting of the public
schools of Tennessee .30 I believe the result in Brentwood
Academy was proper, as the athletic association was very close to
being a governmental agency, despite not actually being one. It
is logical that a private entity with overwhelmingly governmental
entities as its member should be treated as a governmental agency
for Fourteen Amendment purposes.
Even though I believe the result in Brentwood Academy
was correct, there are difficulties with several aspects of the
Court's opinion. I think some of these difficulties will create
problems in the future. First, it is troubling that, given these
facts, four justices were willing to vote that there was no state
action. It is troubling because the Tennessee Association
appeared very close to being a governmental agency. Secondly,
there were very serious analytical problems with the way the
decision was drafted. Early in the opinion Justice Souter stated
that state action was not a question that could be decided based
upon any type of rigid criteria, but rather calls for an essentially
ad hoc determination. 31 The Court said it looks to all of the facts
and circumstances of the state's involvement with the entity to
determine state action status.32 However, just a year earlier in
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan,
the Chief Justice, writing for the Court, tested the state action
issue by reference to two state action doctrines. 3 In American
Manufacturers, the Court stated that the pertinent issues are: (1)
whether the entity carried out a public function, i.e., a function
that has been "traditionally, exclusively and historically"
governmental in nature,34 and (2) whether the state has either
"ordered, coerced, or significantly encouraged" the activity of
29 Id. at 193.
30 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298.
3 Id. at 295.
32 id.
33 Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 49.34 Id. at 50.
2001
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the private entity which is being challenged.35 The Court held
that these are the two state action tests used to determine whether
a private entity is engaged in state action. 36  Additionally, an
analysis of Supreme Court state action decisional law reveals two
other tests, a symbiotic relationship test, and perhaps a joint
action test as well.37
There is another analytical problem with the Brentwood
Academy decision. After stating early on in the decision that
there is no singular test to determine whether state action is
present, it is all ad hoc, 38 the Court used what appears to be a test
to determine state action. After all the facts and circumstances
were examined, Justice Souter ultimately determined that state
action existed because of the state's "pervasive entwinement"
with the athletic association.39  It appears that "pervasive
entwinement" is a test. In this respect, the opinion seems to be
somewhat internally inconsistent. In addition, the Court did not
elaborate or define what is meant by "pervasive entwinement".
It appears to be a type of vague, open-ended standard that may
well create difficulties in the future.
If one surveys the Supreme Court state action decisional
law, the reality is that there are two lines of state action
decisions4° and each takes a different approach to the state action
question. In one line of decisions, which most of the cases
follow, the Court takes a structured approach.4' In a structured
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-24
(1961) (The Court held that given the facts and circumstance of the Delaware
law, under the symbiotic relationship test the restaurant's conduct constituted
state action.), Adikes v. S & H Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (The Court held
that the petitioner could maintain an action under Section 1983 by showing that
a private restaurant and state official acted jointly together for the purposes of
establishing a state action.).
3s BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 295.39 Id. at 291.
40Id. at 290.
41 See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (The Court,
applying a more rigid and structured test, held that a private entity's actions
will only be deemed state action when the state has either exercised coercive
[Vol 18
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approach case, the Court evaluates whether the private entity was
engaged in state action by reference to particular tests.42
Alternatively, there is a second line of state action decisions, like
the Brentwood Academy case, which are more open-ended.43
Instead of utilizing specific tests, these decisions look to all of the
facts and circumstances of the case. 4 The problem is that, given
these two lines of decisions, when a state action issue arises in the
lower courts, it is uncertain how the trial court judge or a group
of appellate judges will evaluate the state action question. When
the state action issue is not governed by some precedent directly
on point, should a court utilize the wide-open approach of
Brentwood Academy, or the more structured approach?
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The issue of procedural due process presents an
interesting question when a dispute arises between the
government and a governmental contractor.45 Lujan v. G & G
Fire Sprinklers is the Supreme Court case that was decided on
this issue this term, which came out of the Ninth Circuit in
California.46 Lujan involved a contract between the state and a
contractor, and another contract between the contractor and the
subcontractor.47 The pertinent California statute states that if the
subcontractor did not meet the state's minimum wage
requirements, the contractor may forfeit up to fifty dollars per
day for each underpaid worker.48 The State of California may
power over the entity or provided such significant encouragement. The Court
in utilizing this test does not differentiate between overt or cover actions, so
long as the choice of the private entity to act can be deemed the state's desire).
42 Id.
41 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295; See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42 (1988).
4id.
45 Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189 (2001).
46 204 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
47 id.
48 Cal. Lab. Code § 1775(a) (2001), provides in pertinent part:
The contractor and any subcontractor under him or her shall, as a penalty to
the state or political subdivision on whose behalf the contract is made or
2001
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withhold payments under the contract that are due and owing to
the contractor, and the contractor in turn can withhold payments
that are due and owing to the subcontractor. 49 The subcontractor
in this case raised an interesting objection, namely, that its
payments were being withheld by the contractor without an
opportunity to be heard.50 The subcontractor's argument was that
this practice violates procedural due process. 51 The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the subcontractor.52 Here is a useful rule of thumb:
If the Ninth Circuit rules for the plaintiff in a civil rights case,
and the Supreme Court grants certiorari, overwhelmingly, the
Ninth Circuit is going to be reversed. True to form, that is
exactly what happened in this case.
This is a fairly short decision, and it is a model of issue
avoidance. I am not going to assign this case in my
Constitutional law class because I do not want the students to
learn how to write an essay that avoids all of the important issues
in a case. For example, there is an issue in the case as to
whether the conduct by the contractor who withheld the payments
due to the subcontractor is a state action. 3  What did the
Supreme Court say on this issue? It said it does "not decide the
issue. "54  Then there was a question as to whether the
subcontractor was deprived of a property interest under the due
process clause. What did the Supreme Court say on this issue?
We assume, without deciding, that the withholding
of money due respondent under its contracts
occurred under color of state law, and as the Court
awarded, forfeit not more than fifty dollars ($ 50) for each calendar day, or
portion thereof, for each worker paid less than the prevailing wage rates...
49 Cal. Lab. Code § 1742(b), the statute provides in pertinent part that "The
contractor or subcontractor under § 1742(b) is entitled to a hearing before the
Director of Industrial Relations, who shall appoint an impartial hearing
officer."
so Lujan, 532 U.S. at 193-94.
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of Appeals concluded, respondent has a property
interest of the kind we considered in Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 55 in its claim for payment
under its contracts.56
The decision ultimately held that, assuming without
deciding that the conduct by the contractor constituted state
action, and assuming further that the subcontractor was deprived
of a protected property interest, there was no violation of
57procedural due process.
The Court was not concerned with the seeming lack of
due process protection afforded the subcontractor because the
subcontractor could always bring suit in the California state
court, either against the State of California or against the
contractor based upon a breach of contract theory.58 An action
for breach of contract would p~rovide an adequate remedy, and
thus satisfy procedural due process. The subcontractor was not
satisfied with this remedy because a contract action in state court
would likely to take a very long time to litigate. The Supreme
Court said, it didn't care about the delay. 59  That is normal.
Litigation takes a long time, and a breach of contract claim is the
normal remedy for this type of contractual dispute.
s5 455 U.S. 422 (1982). The Court held that the time limitation in FEPA
deprived appellant of a property right, and that appellant was entitled to have
the commission consider the merits of his charge based upon the substantiality
of the available evidence, before deciding whether to terminate his claim.56 Lujan, 532 U.S. at 195.
7 Id. at 197-99.
51 Id. at 196.
59 Id. at 196-97. (The Court reasoned that because the California law affords
the respondent sufficient opportunity to be heard and to pursue a claim in the
state courts, "the statutory scheme does not deprive G & G of its claim for
payment without due process." In relying on a prior decision, Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 361 U.S. 886 (1961), the Court reasoned
that, "the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexibility
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. Due Process,
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed consent
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. It is compounded of history,
reason, the past course of decisions. . ") .
2001
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At one point in its opinion, in trying to support its
conclusion that the availability of a breach of contract action was
a remedy that satisfies procedure of due process, the Court said
"the subcontractor is not denied a present entitlement, but was
only denied payment he contended was due under the contract." 
60
I have to tell you, I have thought about that sentence for a long
time. I have absolutely no idea what it means. I have asked
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky ,61 with whom I recently co-chaired
a Supreme Court Review program, and he was similarly puzzled.
I think the true rationale of the decision, which is not articulated
by the Supreme Court, but has been articulated in lower courts
decisions, is that the Court did not want ordinary breach of
contract claims turned into a Section 1983 constitutional law
claims. The Court essentially stated that this is a breach of
contract claim, so let the subcontractor bring suit in state court
under state law for breach of contract.
III. EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT OF THE PRISONER
LITIGATION REFORM ACT
The third issue I will discuss concerns a prisoner's claims
for damages for constitutional violations. The prisoners'
probability of success in these cases is not good. The Court
decided a case this term Booth v. Churner62, dealt with the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act. 63  This exhaustive rule requires
exhaustion of administrative remedies in Federal court cases,
6
0 Lujan, 532 U.S. at 198-99.
61 Erwin Chemerinsky is a Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest
Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science at the University of Southern
California Law School. He is also the Director of the Center for
Communication Law and Policy at the University of Southern California.
62 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
63 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2001) (The Act provides in pertinent part: "no
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States... or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.').
[Vol 18
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including Section 1983 cases, where the prisoner contests the
validity of the conditions of confinement. 64  An interesting
question arises when a prisoner seeks monetary damages for
conditions on confinement that violate a constitutionally protected
right, but the administrative remedy that is available does not
authorize monetary relief. Prisoners around the country argued
that they should not have to exhaust administrative remedies when
the administrative remedy does not authorize the remedy the
prisoner seeks.65 The Supreme Court was unmoved by that
argument.66  The Supreme Court held that the prisoner must
exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act,67 even if the remedy does not authorize the type of
relief that the prisoner is seeking judicially.68
There is a follow up Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
exhaustion case before the Supreme Court this term that comes
out of the Second Circuit,69 Porter v. Nussle.70 The case involves
an excessive force claim, a prisoner claimed the guards used
excessive force that was unconstitutional. 71  The Second Circuit
held that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement did not apply because a
single prisoner's claim that prison guards used excessive force
was not a challenge to prison conditions as a whole. 72  The
64 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. at 733-34. (Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e)(a) as
amended by the Prison Reform Act of 1995, requires prisoners to exhaust
"such administrative remedies as are available" before commencing a lawsuit
involving prison conditions. A prisoner who seeks only money damages must
complete prison administrative processes even though the process has no
provision for recovery of money damages).
61 Booth, 532 U.S. at 735.
6 id.
67 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The Act in pertinent part provides the basis for
applicability of actions in administrative actions, as well as the basis for
dismissal of actions by the court. Further it provides for attorney's fees, and
limitations on recovery.
6' Booth, 532 U.S. at 736.
69 Nussle v. Wilette, 224 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted, Porter v.
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).
70 Porter, 532 U.S. 1065.
71 Nussle, 224 F.3d at 97.
71 d. at 100.
2001
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Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. 7  In all of the
years I have been lecturing on Section 1983 litigation, I have very
rarely made predictions. However, in this case I think the
Second Circuit is going to be overturned. The Supreme Court in
Booth gave a broad reading to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, and the Court
is likely to hold that the exhaustion requirement applies to all
prisoner excessive force claims. Thus, I predict that the Court
will hold that the prisoner's challenge to the conditions of
confinement is inappropriate under the Prisoner Litigation




The fourth issue is the application of qualified immunity to
excessive force claims. In Saucier v. Katz the United States
Supreme Court held that a police officer charged with using
excessive force, either in making an arrest or conducting an
investigatory stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
entitled to qualified immunity as a defense to the claim.75 There
are a couple of pieces to this puzzle to look at in order to evaluate
the significance of the Supreme Court decision. The first part of
the puzzle is that when a plaintiff alleges that a law enforcement
officer used excessive force, either in effectuating an arrest or
conducting an investigatory stop, the test under the Fourth
Amendment is whether the police officer's use of force was
objectively reasonable. 6 Was the use of force a type of force
that, under the circumstances, an objectively reasonable police
officer could have used? As long as it is objectively reasonable,
there is no Fourth Amendment violation." This test gives the
benefit of the doubt to the police officer, the rationale being that
,' Porter, 532 U.S. 1065.
7 Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983, 991-92 (2002).
71 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208-09 (2001).
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police officers often have to make split-second decisions of what
type of force to use when trying to bring an individual within the
physical control of the officer.78
The other part of the puzzle is qualified immunity, which
is a defense that is generally entitled to be asserted by state and
local officials who carry out executive and administrative
functions. Qualified immunity is also a test which asks whether
the officer who carried out the executive function acted in an
objectively reasonable fashion. 79  An officer who violated an
individual's constitutionally-protected right, but who did not
violate a clearly established constitutional right, acted in an
objectively reasonable fashion, and is therefore protected against
monetary liability by the defense of qualified immunity. 80 Putting
these two parts of the puzzle together, the question for the United
States Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz then became: Is it
possible for a police officer who used force that violated the
Fourth Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable, to
have acted objectively reasonably for qualified immunity
purposes? 81 Can an officer act reasonably for qualified immunity
purposes even though the officer acted unreasonably for Fourth
Amendment purposes? This question can certainly cause
headaches, and for that I apologize. The Supreme Court said
yes, it is possible. s2 Accordingly, law enforcement officers who
are sued for excessive force have the right to assert qualified
immunity as a defense.
83
Think about it. If you had a dispute with a loved one or a
close friend, and you felt that this individual treated you in an
unreasonable fashion, would you likely say: "I really do not hate
your guts because I know, even though you treated me
unreasonably, you reasonably treated me unreasonably?" Would
you normally resolve things that way? Yet, that is exactly what
the United States Supreme Court held. Essentially, a police
78 Id.
79 Saucier, 533 U.S. 194 at 205
80 Id. at 206.
81 Id. at 206-07.
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officer can be protected by qualified immunity even though the
officer acted in an objectively unreasonable fashion under the
Fourth Amendment.84  What this means is that the law
enforcement officer has two levels of "objectively reasonable"
protection: one level of protection under the Fourth Amendment,
and then a second layer level of protection under qualified
immunity .85 The rationale is that a law enforcement officer may
have used unreasonable force within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, but may have made a reasonable mistake, 86 either in
assessing the facts, or in evaluating the Fourth Amendment
decisional law, which is not always crystal clear as to the type of
force that is unreasonable. 87
I think the Saucier decision is not likely to have a
tremendous impact. In the truly egregious excessive force cases,
the extreme brutality cases where police officers brutalized an
individual without legitimate justification, the plaintiffs are going
to win. They are going to win despite the added level of
objective reasonableness protection, for that matter, no matter
how many levels of objective reasonableness protection was given
to the police officer. On the other hand, in the great majority of
close call cases where it is unclear whether the police officer's
use of force violated the Fourth Amendment, whether it was
objectively reasonable or not within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, the police officer is going to prevail anyway,
because the Fourth Amendment standard gives the benefit of the
doubt to the police officer. 88 The Supreme Court in Graham
instructed lower courts to give deference to police officers who
make difficult decisions concerning the appropriate use of force.
I think that the real motivation behind the Supreme
Court's decision that qualified immunity applies to Fourth
Amendment excessive force claims was to allow trial judges to
resolve excessive force claims early in the litigation when the
84 id.
85 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.
86 id.
87 id.
88 Id. at 207.
[Vol 18
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police officer's counsel makes a summary judgment motion based
upon qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has said over and
again, qualified immunity is not only a defense from liability, it is
also a defense from the burden of litigation, and trial judges
whenever possible should decide the immunity issue early in the
litigation. 89 But I think that philosophy does not work too well in
excessive force cases, because these cases are usually
fact-specific with material facts in dispute. 90 The plaintiff will
undoubtedly submit an affidavit that swears, "I was just minding
my own business, whistling a patriotic tune and the police officer
shot me in the leg." While the officer will swear that "the
plaintiff was cursing, threatening, and lunged at me, and it was
only then that I shot the plaintiff in the leg." The qualified
immunity defense cannot be resolved in such a case until the
material facts are found.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's decision may
impose pressure, and the lower court judges may feel that
pressure, to try to resolve excessive force cases on the basis of
qualified immunity early in the litigation. If that happens, then
the Saucier decision will have significant impact.
V. AT'rORNEY'S FEES
The last issue I am going to discuss concerns statutory
attorney's fees. In Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Services,91 the
Supreme Court held that to be a prevailing party eligible for an
award of statutory attorney's fees under Federal civil rights fee
shifting statutes, the plaintiff must obtain either a favorable
89 See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991); See also Crawford v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (Qualified immunity operates as a shield to police
officers and prevents them from being subject to liability for acting when such
action is deemed objectively reasonable). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (The qualified immunity defense is an early procedural
protection against unwarranted and disruptive pretrial litigation).
90 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
91 532 U.S. 598 (2000).
2001
15
Schwartz: Section 1983 Cases
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAWREVIEW
judgment on the merits or a consent decree. 92 This means that a
showing by the plaintiff that the lawsuit served as a catalyst that
prompted the defendant to take some type of corrective action,
giving the plaintiff what the plaintiff was seeking, will not qualify
the plaintiff as a prevailing party. 9  For example, if the
government defendant granted the plaintiff a public benefit or
some type of license this will not suffice to qualify the plaintiff as
a prevailing party, even though the lawsuit established its goal.
The Buckhannon case was brought under the Fair Housing
Act 94 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 95 However, the
Supreme Court's decision made clear that its rejection of the
catalyst doctrine applies to civil rights fee shifting statutes across
the board,96 including the fee shifting statute that applies to
Section 1983 cases.
97
The precise question in Buckhannon was whether the
plaintiff is a prevailing party if the plaintiff shows that the lawsuit
served as a catalyst to prompt the defendant to give the plaintiff
what the plaintiff was seeking. This should be strictly a matter of
statutory interpretation, namely, the meaning of prevailing party.
But if you look at the lineup of the justices, and if you contrast
the majority and dissenting opinions, it seems there is more going
on here than just an effort by the justices to figure out what
Congress intended.
98
The Chief Justice wrote the opinion of the Court, and was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
These five justices are normally regarded as the most
conservative members of the Court. 99  The more moderate
members of the Court were in the dissent: Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer. 00 That is the
92 Id. at 1838.
93 Id.
9' 42 U.S.C. § 3613(2) (1988).
9' 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2001).
96 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 605.
9' Id. at 607-08.
98 Id. at 608.
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same alignment we have so often seen in the Federalism cases. 101
Further, it is the same alignment we saw in Bush v. Gore.
102
Perhaps the particular alignment of the justices was mere
coincidence, but one has to wonder: was the Buckhannon decision
truly based upon Congressional intent? Further the decision
effectively reversed the holdings of no less than eleven circuits. 103
Eleven circuits held that a plaintiff is entitled to fees under the
so-called "catalyst option." 10 4  The only circuit which was
consistent with the Court's decision was the Fourth Circuit,
which is widely regarded as the most conservative in the
country. 10 5 You can draw your own conclusions as to whether
the majority decision in Buckhannon was purely and strictly based
upon an attempt to figure out true Congressional intent about the
meaning of "prevailing party."
The Buckhannon decision is a very damaging decision for
civil rights plaintiffs. Civil rights plaintiffs may litigate a case
very hard for many years, and on the eve of trial, the attorney for
the municipality or the state can simply provide the relief sought
101 See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); U.S. v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v. U.S., 521
U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); U.S. v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
102 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
103 See Stanton v. S. Berkshire Reg'l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 (1st Cir.
1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1992); Baumgartner v.
Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 548 (3d Cir. 1994); Associated
Builders and Contractors of La., Inc., v. Orleans Parish Sch., 919 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1990); Payne v. Bd. of Ed., 88 F. 3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996); Zinn
v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 274 -76 (7th Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Pulaski Cty. Sch. Dist., 17 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1994); Kilgour v. City of
Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 950-52
(10th Cir. 1994); Morris v. City of W. Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207
(11th Cir. 1999); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
104 id.
'o' See, e.g., S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Ed. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (The court held that attorney's fees will only be awarded
if the party obtains an enforceable judgment. The court specifically rejected
the "catalyst theory" as the basis for seeking attorney's fees).
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by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff will be unable to recover
attorney's fees. 10 6  In addition, if the complaint alleges, for
example, that an ordinance is unconstitutional, the municipality
can escape the statutory obligation of attorney's fees by repealing
the offensive ordinance prior to the court's determination of the
merits.1 0 7 Even though the plaintiff expended large resources in
litigating the case, and the case established the goal of the
litigation, the plaintiff will not be entitled to attorney's fees.
Moreover, the Court made it clear that even if the case
culminates in a settlement, if that settlement is not memorialized
in a consent decree, the plaintiff is not a "prevailing party"
eligible for attorney's fees under a federal fee shifting statute.' 08
I think Buckhannon is very bad interpretation of federal fee
shifting statutes. The dominant purpose of the civil rights fee
shifting statutes was to encourage private individuals to act as
private attorney generals in enforcing the nation's civil rights
laws. Buckhannon retards that goal. It is not clear why a
plaintiff who has obtained the object of the litigation, like a public
benefit or a license, is somehow less worthy of a fee award than a
plaintiff who is awarded a judgment. I suppose there is an
argument if the state just voluntarily gives the plaintiff what she
sought, the state could choose to take it away. On the other
hand, when courts issue judgments they are not always complied
with, and certainly not immediately. I also think the decision is a
setback for the administration of justice, because civil rights
plaintiffs will be less inclined to settle cases.
In sum, I think the case is bad law, bad logic, and bad for
the administration of justice. While Congress is free to overturn
the decision, it seems as though Congress has better things to do
these days.
'06 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-04.
107 Id. at 604.
lo' Id. at 603.
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